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THE PLACE OF THE SUBLIME:
TOWARD A POSTMODERN SUBLIME IN TIm WAKE
OF KANT AND IN HONOR OF DUFRENNE
Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature,
but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our
superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside
us (as far as it influences us).
-- Immanuel Kant, The Critique ofJudgement
The sublime would thus be... our feeling of alienation or
being lost in the aesthetic object, the sacrüice of subjectivity to
something toward which it transcends itself and which transcends
it.
Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of
Aesthetic Experience
In its very disproportionateness, the sublime is still a human
measure.
-- Jacques Derrida, "WhyPeter Eisenman Writes
Such Good Books"
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Where is the sublime? How are we to loeate it? What is it to
loeate something as apparently amorphous and ethereal as the sublime
-- whose very name connotes vaporization? What does it mean to find a
place, a proper place (if there is one), for the sublime? These are
questions that Mikel Dufrenne might weIl have asked, and if he did not
do so explicitly, they were close to his concerns in Le Poetique and in
later writings on the poetic power of nature. In my presentation today, I
shall render homage to the man to whom I owe so much by considering
something he treated only passingly in the otherwise comprehensive
corpus of his work.
Notice that I do not ask: What is the sublime? That question
would move· us somewhere else indeed. Not only would it involve us in
a search for the elusive essence of sublimity, but it would force us to
compare different theories of the sublime: those, say, of Longinus, Burke,
and Kant. Instead of any such search or comparison, I want to consider
the question of the locus of the sublime in terms borrowed from Kant,
who (along with Alain) was the main inspiration for Dufrenne's
oceasional speculations on the sublime. It was doubtless Kant's insistence
on the rooting of the sublime in the human subject that discouraged
Dufrenne from undertaking his own independentexploration of the topic.
It is as if Dufrenne thought that the sublime had been forever tainted by
. the transcendental turn and thus was better avoided altogether in the
phenomenologyand ontology of art -- unless it could be rethought as that
which "arises when we renounce a11 feeling, all return to self, in order to
exist in the object through the sublimation of subjectivity."1 Here I shall
take up Dufrenne's challenge to rethink Kant by embedding the latter's
looming subjectivism in a more capacious problematic, that of its Ioeation
in what I shall eall"wildseapes." In this way, I shall try to think through
the sublime on its own terms and in its own direction -- and in such a way
1 The most important allusions to the sublime are in Mikel Dufrenne, PhenomenoJogy
ofAeslhetic Experience, tr. E. S. Casey et all (Evanston : Northwestem University Press,
1973), Pp. 61, 82, 162, 162n., 427; and his Le poetique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1963), where on P. 172 Dufrenne acknowledges that the sublime can be said to
"precede, if not condition, the experience of the Poetic." Hut insofar as this implies that
Nature has to be conceived in its "savage immensity," Dufrenne concludes that "it is not on
this route alone that we must orient the analysis of the poetic." (Ibid.) As he specidies on
p. 194, "if one wants to specify the poetic as an aesthetic category," then it resides [rather]
both in the generosityand benevolence of the sensible." Für Dufrenne's most mature
conception of Nature, see Uinvenlaire des apriori: recherche de foriginaire (Paris:
Bourgeois, 1981), Part Three, chapter four.
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as to engender a specüically postmodern sense of sublimity. Thanks to
Kant's often aporetic pronouncements, I shall concern myself with how
the sublime figures in concrete landscapes -- how, more generally, it
forms part of placescapes (of which wildscapes are a distinctive subset)
in order to discern how there can be a sublime of such -scapes.
Ultimately, it is a matter of locating the sublime through and in wild
places (and only then through their representations in paintings and other
art forms). Or more exactly, of locating the aesthetic power of the
sublime through the elemental power of the non-simple emplacement it
effects and requires.
1
In The Critique ofJudgment Kant presents us with a paradox of
placement. On the one hand, what is sublime -- mathematically or
dynamically so -- is indissociably linked with naturalobjects. Without (the
experience of) these objects, we would' not have the least inkling of
sublimity. Even if they do not house the sublime in any straightforward
way, they are indispensable for eticiting the sublime: "arousing" it and
"prompting" it, as Kant puts it. They may not hold the sublime, but they
do seem to present it. They certainly occasion it. On the other hand, the
generation of the sublime occurs in uso The place of this generation is
within. As Kant says expressly, "true sublimity must be sought only in the
mind (im Gemüt) of the judging person, not in the natural object the
judging of which prompts this mental attunement." 2 The sublime is a
mental event, not a natural phenomenon. It is what happens to us in us
insofar as we are solicited by a natural spectacle. Requisite as the
spectacle is, it does not possess the sublime as a property or power of its
own. As Kant adds, "all we are entitle to say is that the [natural object is
suitable for exhibiting a sublimity that can be found [angetroffen:
encountered] in the mind. For what is sublime, in the proper meaning of
the term, cannot be contained in any sensible form. 3 This is why Kant
denies outright that even the most tumultuous ocean can be called
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackette,
1987), p. 113.
3 Ibid., p. 99. The referencce to "arousing" (regemachen) occurs at ibid: the sublime
"concerns only ideas of reason, which, though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are
aroused and called to mind, by this very inadequacy, which can be exhibited in sensibility."
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sublime: it is properly termed "horrible"(grAsslich). "The sight of it," says
Kant, "is horrible; and one must already have fIlled one's mind with all
sorts of ideas Ü such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself
sublime."4 It is the feeling, not the natural scene, that is sublime.
Kant, then, appears to force us to a choice. Either the sublime
is something in nature, or it is something in us. Although Kant is
determined to locate the sublime in us, he acknowledges the power ofthe
temptation to find it in nature. In fact, he succumbs to this temptation
hirnself, given that his own prototypes of the sublime are almost
invariably drawn from the natural world: "bold, overhanging and, as it
were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving
about accompanied by lightening and thunderclaps, volcanoes with a11
their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave
behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty
river, and so on."5 These are, of course, examples of the dynamically
sublime -- of nature in its sheer "might" (Macht) -- but for Kant the
mathematically sublime, i.e., the absolutely large in "magnitude"(GrOsse),
is also most effectively presented in natural terms. Regarding the
mathematically sublime, he mainstains that "nature is sublime in those of
its appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of their infitinity."6
But Kant draws back from the virtually irresistible tendency to loeate
sublimity squarely in nature, for it is only by amistaken maneuver that we
come to believe that sublimity belongs properly to natural objects
themselves. We attribute to nature the sublimity that belongs to ourselves
by virtue of the "vocation" (Bestimmung) of our cognitive powers to rise
to the challenge of those natural appearances that suggest spatial infmity
or overpowering might.
What a later era would call "projection" -- in the wake of
Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud -- Kant designates as "subreption," literally
'snatching-under' in an effort to disguise-as.7 We disguise as belonging to
the object, as "intuitable for us," what really belongs to the subject, the
.. Ibid., p. 99.
sIbid., p. 120.
6 Ibid., p. 112 More completely: that magnitude of a natural object to which the
imagination fruitlessly applies its entire ability to comprehend must lead the conept of
nature to a supersensible substrate... a substrate that is large beyond any standard of sense"
(ibid).
7Ibid, p. 144. Tbe idea of "subreption" is first defined in the Inaugural Dissertation of
1770: "We may call fallaqr of subreption (by analogy with the accepteed meaning) the
intellect's trick of slipping in a concept of sense as if it were the concept of an intellectual
characteristic."
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judging subject whose inner powers are engaged and excited by the
prospect of great might or magnitude. The imagination in particular is
called to present to itself, in a single comprehensive whole, what exceeds
its power of representation. But this very inadequacy (and its consequent
displeasure) only selVes to remind the subject of the much greater power
of its own ideas of reason, which demand an "absolute whole" that
exceeds not just what imagination can produce but what the natural world
can present. That this absolute totality is "impossible'~ -- impossible
because no progression of images, no matter how numerous or richly
laden, will ever attain it -- is beside the point. What is to the point is the
striving to reach it in the very face of certain failure, the ability that
entails inability, the purposive as confronted with the contrapurposive,
and the "pleasure that is possible only by means of [the consequent]
displeasure."8
No wonder we are "agitated"(bewegt) in the subreptive presence
of the sublime.9 Such agitation is emotional; it is a matter of being
moved (from) without: "e-motion." But this without is not the without of
a bare particular, of a self-subsistent thing. Only in the case of beauty do
we justifiably "seek a basis [for jUdgment] outside ourselves," that is, in
the formal purposiveness of nature or the work of art. In the case of the
sublime, however, we look for a basis "within ourselves," yet precisely
because we fail to find it, we become embroiled in an unremitting
"conflict"(Widerstreit) between imagination and reason. 10 For no matter
how striking appearances 'may be -- even if "shapeless mountain masses
[are] piled on one another in wild disarray, with their pyramids of ice"ll
8 ''The proper unchangeable basic measure of nature is the absolute whole of nature...
This basic measure, however, is a self-contradictory concept (because an absolute totality
of an endless progression is impossible." (Ibid., p. 112). The analogy between such a totality
and that at stake in the regulative use of reason in its dialectical employment -- as
described in Tbe Crilique of Pure Reason -- is striking.
9 Cf. ibid., p. 115: "If a [thing] is excessive for the imagination (and the imagination id
driven to [such excess] as it apprehends [the ,thing] in intuition, then [the thing] is, as it
were, an abyss in which the magination is afraid to lose itself."
10 Cf.ibid., p. 100: "For the beautiful in nature we must seek a basis outside ourselves,
but for the sublime a basis merely within ourselves and in the way of thinking that
introduces sublimity into our presentation of nature." On the "conflict" as such, see ibid., p.
116.
11 Ibid., p. 113.
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-- they are judged as dynamically sublime only insofar as they engage us
in the emotional turmoil of an endless struggle between the imaginative
and the rational. The dynamics of physics has become psyehodynamics as
we enter into a losing game of cateh-up between what reason demands
and imagination can deliver.
Nevetheless, it is the world in its wildness -- "erude nature" as he
calls it revealingly12 -- that first agitates us by prompting the futile but
irresistible attempt to imagine it as an absolute whole, leading us to try
in vain to inelude its unboundednesswithin the bounds of sensibility. But
what is the status of this wild world? Is it something purely "phenomenal"
as it is offieially held to be in the Critique of Pure Reason? Or is it
something more than "mere appearance (blosse Erscheinung)," a source
that is a genuine resource, something under or beyond appearance?
When Kant says that "nature is sublime in those of its appearances whose
intuition carries with it the idea of their infinity," he only makes the
ambiguity patent: sublime in its appearances (i.e., a matter of sensibility
and imagination), nature as sublime elicits the idea of an infinity (a
matter of reason) whose proper province is the noumenal realm, that is,
an overtly "supersensible substrate."!3 A considerable part of the power
of the sublime, helping to aeeount for its combined effeet of attraeting yet
repelling us, is its very indeterminate locus on the cusp between the
phenomenal and the noumenal, between whieh the sublime seems- to
oseillate. But this indeterminacy only makes us wonder whether the
options at stake here are the only relevant ones. No more than the
sublime is found merely in matter or in mind is it to be located in
phenomena Q! in noumena. The exelusiveness of the binary choice
operative in both instanees cannot be taken for granted. Is there another
way of eonceiving the loeus of the sublime that is at onee less
dichotomous and less likely to lead to the invoeation of tendentious
tanseendental maehinery?
12 On "erude nature" (rohen Natur), see ibid., p. 109.
13 "Henee that magnitude of a natural objeet to whieh the magination fruitlessly applies
its entire ability to eomprehend must lead the eoneept of nature to a supersensible substrate
(whieh underlies both nature and out ability to think), a substrate that is large beyond any
,standard of sense and henee makes us judge as sublime not so mueh the objeet as the




Much as Heidegger opens "The Origin of tbe Work of Art" by
asking where is the artwork (-Wo aber ist das Kunstwerk), I started by
asking: Where is the sublime? For Kant, itsemplacement is complex. The
place of the sublime certainly seems to be in the natural world -- at first
blush, there and nowhere else. But appearances are as misleading as
they are necessary, here as weIl as elsewhere in the world of
transcendental topics. The apparent objectivity of the sublime is an
illusion, fabricated by an act of unconscious subreption. The proper seat
of the sublime is in the human subject -- there and not anywhere else.
But this seat is not a secure foundation. By Kant's own admission, it is a
place of continual and irresolvable conflict and finally an "abyss," an
Abgrund. The seat is insecure; it is an unsettled, and unsettling, seat. If
we are to begin to find a Grund for this Abgrund, we cannot confine the
role of nature in the generation of the sublime to thatof mere prompter
of subjective psychodramas? Kant's own unabashed recourse to examples
taken straight from experiences of wilderness (albeit as reported by
others), and above all his own insistence that nature arouses and agitates
us only when it "displays magnitude and might," point in quite another
direction: that of acknowledging the natural world in its own force and
circumstance, its own power. But in what does this power consist, and
how is it (set fortn) in place? What is the true place of the sublime?
The sublime needs to be located, or rather relocated. We need
to re-place it somewhere other than (simply) in the subject. Does this
mean to place it in the (natural) object? Certainly not. Not just because
such placement would proceed by an illusory subreption but because,
more importantly, to loeate the sublime in an object is to suppose that it
is a property of things, something attached to the object as an attribute
is to a substance. This may be a plausible account of beauty, about which
we speak "as if it were a property of things... [We say] the thing is
beautiful."14 The "horriblen may weIl be located in natural objects, but
14 Ibid., p. 56; his italics. Dcf. also p. 54: the judging person "will talk about the beautiful
as if beauty were a characteristic of the objecl." On p. 100 Kant remarks that "for the
beautiful in nature we must seek a basis outside ourselves, but for the sublimr a basis
merely within ourselves."
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for Kant the Ioeation of the sublime is within: in a feIt sUbjectivity.15
To demand that the sublime be loeated in the natural object,
whether as an attribute or in some other way, is to presume that it ean
be simply located there: that it is just there, in that pinpointed Iocus, and
nowhere else. 1 borrow the notion of "simple loeation" from Whitehead,
who regards it as "the very foundation of the seventeenth century scheme
of nature."16 This scheme continues into the eighteenth century -- with
the notable exceptions of Berkeley and Leibniz -- and it is still formative
for Kant, as late as his 1786 treatise Metaphysical FoundationsofNatural
Science, where Kant maintains that "the place of every body is a
point."17 According to the doctrine of simple loeation, something
(whether a color or shape, or the sublime) is simply where it is and not
anywhere else: "it is just in this place and in no other."18 It is in this
pinpointed place without reference, even implicit reference, to any other
place.
By loeating the sublime inside the mind, Kant hints at a different
kind of loeation. Not just beeause mind is non-physieal but beeause
"mind" (das Gemüt) is inherently complex, as the collective prefix "Ge_li
indicates: it includes emotion as well as cogitation, heart as weil as mind,
imagination as weIl as memory, and (via the sensus communis) others as
well as seIfe Being found there properly, the sublime eannot be a mere
"property" (Eigenschaft) or "characteristic" (Beschaffenheit). It is
immanent in the subject and not Ioeated at the surface of an object.
Further, it is a function of a complex internal process, a psychieal event,
that in its inadequation to the demands of reason is self-divisive and
finally abyssal. This hints at a different notion of loeation, a decidedly
non-simple Ioeation (and all the Iess simple as it ~ the infinityof reason's
15 Ibid., p. 145. My italics. Ultimately, beauty resides somewhere BETWEEN the
object and the beholder: we call something beautiful "only by virtue of what characteristic
in which it adapts itself to the way we apprehend it."
16 Alfred North Whitehead. Science and the Modem World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1929), p. 72.
17 Kant. First Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature, chapter one: "First
Metaphysical Principles of Phoronomy," second definition, first remark. It would be of
interest (but beyond the scoepe of this paper) to compare Kant's discussions of "dy6namics"
in chapter two of this treatise with his later conception of the dynamical sublime.
18 Ibid., p. 80. A more technical definition is this: "to say that a bit of matter has simple
location means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations, it is adequate to state that
it is where it is, in a definite finite region of space, and throughout a definite finite duration
of time, apart from any essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other
regions of space and to other duration of time."
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domain, i.e., the supersensible, that is an abyss for imagination).19 Yet
it only hints at a variant· view of Ioeation, and falls to deliver an
alternative model.
The deeper difficulty resides in an unexamined presumption:
namely, that the sublime (or anything else, for that matter) is located
either in the judging subject or in the natural objecl. Either in Mind or
in Nature. But (as we have also seen in the case of its phenomenalor
noumenalIoeation) the sublime itself contests any such exclusive choice
-- any such forced option. To be Iocated is not necessarily to be
positioned in one of these two "places." Moreover, to be Iocated in a
sense fitting for the sublime ealls for a sense of place that eannot be
reduced to position -- thus to "site," as I prefer to call the sheer
positioning of objects in homogeneous space.
If we are truly to find a place for the sublime, we must consider
two things: first, a sense of place that exceeds Ioeation qua position;
second, a model of emplacement as something other than single or
exclusive (bOlh of these being univocal in character) but also not
indifferently anywhere or everywhere (this is to make emplacement
entirely equivocal). How, then, to proceed?
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We proceed best by just looking around us. When we do, we
"take in" (as Kant himself is wont to put it) not just objects, much less
sensations, but entire scenes, landseapes of many sorts, and in particular
cityscapes, skyseapes, seaseapes, wildseapes. We can experience the
sublime in each ease: in New York or in the North Atlantic, in
approaching storms and in desolate deserts, or for that matter in the
vacant lot next door. Tbe sublime, we might say, is not in us or in
particular objects but around us: in what Heidegger ealls "the aroundness
of the environment."2o To be in an environment or landseape is to be
surrounded by a set of places, not to be confronted by just this place --
19 Reason "look[s) outward toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss" (ibid).,
p. 124; cf. also p. 115: what is "excessive for imagination" is "an abyss in which the
imagination is afraid to lose itself."
20 'The Aroundness of the Environment (Das Umhafte der Umwelt) and is the title of
Chapter three of Division One of Being and Time, tr. J. Masquarrie & Robinson (New
York: Harper, 1962), pp. 134 ff.
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not just a co-positioning of sites.
If the sublime is (to be) placed in alandscape, it.will thus be
muItipIy placed. It is a matter of multiple Ioeation, of what Freud terms
"muItilocuIarity."21 This is why we speak with equalfacility of the sublime
in landseape or of the sublime of Iandseape -- or, indeed, of the sublime
through landseape. This is not just a matter of ambiguity, of merely
indefinite loeation. Nor is it a question of serial Ioeation, as if these
different places could be arranged in a strict sequence. On the contrary:
if the sublime is multilocular, it is so a11 at once, as I know in a single
comprehensive sweep of my glance when I take in what is arrayed around
me. It is a matter, in short, of what Kant calls (in another context)
"universal participation."22 Such participation gives a new sense to Kant's
notion of "comprehension," a term he himself restricted to inwardIy
generated presentations of imagination that are foredoomed to
incompletion.23 But Ü comprehension ean be defined without taking this
skeptieal and subjective turn, we are availed of an apposite description
of what happens in the actual perception of the sublime. For we
comprehend tbe sublime by participating in it: by realizing that, just as it
is not simpIy in me, it is not entirely outside me either. To be placed in
a sublime landseape is to be Iocated in a region where I am myself a
participant -- where I partake of tbe places by which I am surrounded.24
Indeed, if we take the word "comprehend" apart, we arrive not
21 S. Freud, Project for a Sciewntific Psychology," in Complete Psychological Worts of
Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth, 1954), 1,225.
22 "Allgemeine Teilnehmung" : ibid p. 158. Kant is here speaking of the universal
participation at stake in the sensus communis, but the phrase can be construed to have a
broader relevance.
23 Kant contrasts bare Ifapprehension," which is capable of progressing to infinity in an
open series of acts with "comprehension" (comprehensio aesthica), for when the latter
reaches its "basic measure (Grundmass) in the estimation of a given magnitude, i.e. its
maximal unit of grasp, it "loses as much on the one side as it gains on the other" (ibid)., p.
108 and it mmust advance without being able to take in what lies on either side of its basic
measure.
24 We should also reconceive Kant's unwieldy definition of comprehension as aiming at
"the aesthetically largest measure for an estimation of magnitude" (ibid., p. 108). For in
taking in a multilocular environment we also attempt to size it up by means of its most
comprehensive unity, for example, by attending to the horizon encircling the scene; the
horizon acts as the "basic measure" (Grundmass) for all that it encircles. Only if the
sublime entails the completion of an infinite series, or the grasp of an absolute totality, does
such environmental comprehension faH. OthelWise, such comprehensiosucceeds admirably
and spontaneously to take in the landscape that subtends a horizon, its many places, in
short the whole placescape.
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just at the idea of 'grasping-together' but, more particularly, at the notion
of "prehension"-- which, for Whitehead, is the very basis for a view of the
world (and ofthings in this world) as non-simply located. Either we grasp
the world "separatively" or "prehensively."25 In the fIrSt case, we fall prey
to the atomization of the world into discrete objects (and subjects) and
equally discrete positions, while in the second we take it in, participate in
it, as one continuous (but heterogeneously qualified) whole. But the in
into which we take it is no longer the interiority of transcendental
subjectivity; it is the pre-hending openness of an aesthetically sensitive
subject who is part of the aroundness of a multilocular environment --
and part as well (as Kant would be the' first to insist) of a community of
like-minded judgers: another mulilocular place, social in its· very
constitution.
What we thus comprehend is the sublime, located neither inside
the estimating or emoting subject nor in estimated or emotionally moving
objects but in the whole of a naturally given and cu1turally informed
landscape of which the subject is an integral part. This landscape is a
privileged place that is able to elicit an experience of the sublime, an
eminent domain in short.
Not only is landscape in all of its forms (urban, aerial, oceanic,
tellurian, etc.) privileged but there is a privileged f<?rm of this complex
place when it comes to the sublime as conceived by Kant. I refer to wild-
scape, apre-eminent kind of place, a primus inter pares. Why is this so?
IV
The most direct answer is power: wilderness, wild places, exhibit
the power of nature construed as "the overpowering." Kant's insistence on
magnitude and might as the major forms of sublimity only carries forward
Burke's strong statement that "I know of nothing sublime which is not
some modification of power.tl26 For bOlh Burke and Kant, wilderness' is
the most perspicuous scene of sheer, stark power. But is the sublime,
2S ''Things are separated by space, and are separated by time, but they are also together
in space, and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these
characters the 'separative' and the 'prehensive' characters of space-time" (Science and the
Modem World, p. 80; his italics).
U Edmund Burke. A Philosophical EnquiIy into the origina of our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful (Oxford; University Press, 1990), p. 54.
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even in its wild appearances, merely a matter of power, itself a most
characteristically modern, post-Baconian notion? Can we think it
otherwise -- if not as potestas, then, as potentia, as something softer and
more subtle? Or if we must think of it as power, then power of another
sort than that which overwhelms us?
The best way to approach these difficult matters is to point to the
close link between the sublime and place, as I have already begun to do
in this paper.. The issue then becomes one of emplacement rather than
empowerment, of immanence rather than transcendence: or rather, of
transcendance in immanence: of the sublime in placz. To regard
wilderness as exemplary -- as Kant and his many Romantic legatees did
--would then mean heeding it as a domain of wild pJaczs and not just as
a repository of chaotic and threatening forces. The wild world is sublime
in the way it brings together a skein of places so thoroughly intertwined
as to defy analysis into any given natural law or cultural artefact -- or
even into any formal purposiveness such as beauty provides, much less
into any determinate object in which it is held to be located.
In order to rethink the sublime in this direction, we need to
remind ourselves that the very word "sub-lime" signifies to move up to the
threshold: sub, "under" but also "up to," "toward"; timen, "door," "lintel,"
"threshold." The movement up from under is matched by a provisional
closure trom on top: "linter' in turn means "a horizontal piece of timber,
stone, etc., placed over a door, window, or other opening to discharge the
superincumbentweight."(O.E.D.; my italics). The sublime is a matter of
movement in place -- where "place" does not connote any strict limit or
border but a boundary that receives movement even as it "discharges
superincumbent weight. tI
To grasp the sublime as multiply emplaced in a wildscape, it is
helpful to consider two of its distinctive traits: threshold and porosity.
(a) tbreshold. To be sublime is to be at the threshold, to be
literally "subliminal," i.e, moving up to a pre-limin-ary limit. Instead of
being an absolute limit, something maximally magnitudious or mighty --
something fiercely colossal and thus vertical -- the limit proper to the
sublime can be reconceived as minimal and horizontaland changing (just
as a lintel is literally horizontal and changes in accordance with the load
it bears). In the case of wilderness, the horizontal is the horizon: this is
what the -scape of "wildscape" connotes. Here the limen changes in
accordance with my moving body, enticing it into the larger perceptible
surround. (The sublime also balm the body in breathless reception: as in
Caspar David Friedrich's paintings of figures who, their backs to us, drink
in the landscape before and around them.) Nor isi this surround a simple,
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single place; it is (in J.J. Gibson's word) a "layout" of places, a collocation
(not just a co-Ioeation), that as a gathered group draws the receptive
subject into its embrace, draws this subject out, draws it to a nearby limit
that cannot be reached as such, thereby constituting a "limit situation,"
a GreDDituationin Jaspers's term. The sublime limit, the limit as sublime,
draws us out to take it in.
(b) plrosity. By the same token, and thanks to the same
threshold, what I encounter as sublime is a scene of open places. No
place in the sublime is simply located. Every place is open to every other.
Which is not to say that it just is· every other: difference remains in
openness. This must be the case if the sublime is trulya movement across
or (still better) tbrough places. To go across or through is to require a
matrix of places open to each other and not closed in upon their own
proper content -- as we find in Aristotle's a-poretic model of topos as
"the innermost unmoving container of what is contained."27 In sublimatic
motion the emphasis is on what one moves toward, not from; around, not
at out not in.28 This is "free play" with a special twist: not an interplay of
faculties or "powers" (Vermögens), but an osmotic play of interconnected
places in the landscape, their co-constitution in a layout of more or less .
amicable relations. It is a matter of a Spielraum of places, not a
Streitraum of contending forces.
The threshold of the sublime is resolutely without -- in the place-
scape -- and not within the subject as the singular source of rational ideas.
These ideas are cognitive thresholds toward which the judging subject
strives. Like the horizon of a wildscape, the limit of a rational idea such
as freedom, God, or the absolutely large, is never attained, never grasped.
But the places of a sublime wildscape are attainable and available: thanks
to their porosity, theyare always already attained in ordinary perception.
In this way, the hieratic Being of unbounded Ideas gives way to the fluid
Becoming of a bounded landscape. The open is no longer located in the
subject, deposited there as the abyss of its futile efforts to reach (or
resist) overpowering magnitude or might. No( is is found in the free
facultative play of this subject. It is found in the Open of Place, the
opening of the whole scene around us, beyond us, under us, yet always
near us and finally part of us. Thus a double de-subjectification, a dual
dis-enclosure, is at stake as the sublime moves outward into the land or
27 Aristotle, PhysiQ, Boot IV.
28 Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the "in" (en) in the physics of place: cf.
Physics, Boot Iv, chapter eight.
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sea or sky.
To de-subjectify the sublime is to de-verticalize it. Only when the
sublime is ensconced within the subject does this subject subject itself to
the sublime as to something colossal: the extremity of one rejoins the
extremity of the other. But if the sublime is not arrayed before the
subject as an object of "amazement" (Verwunderung) it can disintegrate
into the laid-out landscape and become part of its horizontality, an
immanent transcendence there. In this way the sublime becomes part of
the landscape's dimeusionaHty. For ü the sublime is indeed multilocular,
it requires leeway in a11 directions: depth as weIl as height, horizontality
as weIl as verticality, breadth and width and interstices of aIl kinds. For
such-dimensions make available the commonality of the places that make
up a sublime scene, their accessibility to us as participants in them.
v
This essay in homage to Mikel Dufrenne, starting from exposition
and critique of the Critique of Judgment, has gone on to propose an
alternative to the Kantian paradigm, in which the sublime is caught up in
rertain binary oppositions: subject and object, mind and nature,
mathematical and dynamic, phenomenal and noumenal, not to mention
empirical and transcendental, apriori and aposteriori: the list could
continue indefinitely. These pairings purport to be exclusive as weIl as
exhaustive in their conceptuality. Yet the sublime eludes such exclusion
and exhaustion. This is already true of Kant's own model, which
deconstructs its own oppositional formulation by employing such
interstitial notions as Genius and Gemllt and sensus oommUDis, or by the
coupling of apprehension with comprehension, imagination with reason:
neither pair can be fuIly analyzed in terms of straightforward binary
oppositions but each lives out a dense dialectic.
But 1 have maintained that we need to do more than pit Kant
against hirnself. We need to find a term that is not merely a member of
another binary pair -- indeed, one that undermines binarism at its own
game. In my view "place" is such a term. Never merely the other of time
or space but equiprimordialwith these latter, place resists pairing. It does
so by its participative status: place is not external to me, part of res
exteDSa. Place is part of me and I of it. It is a participant in
my ongoing life and I in its. As participative in this twofold way, place
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straddles the timen of the sublime, complieating any effort to simply
loeate sublimity on one side or the other of this porous threshold. There
is no such thing as one place, or two places. Places proliferate on either
side of any given threshold, including that of the sublime. If the sublime
is indeed a threshold, then its place will not be simple or unitary: it will
be multiply placed and itself place-productive. This is part of its very
power: not just to excite and move us, but to engender ever new modes
of emplacement.
To seek the sublime in this postKant, postmodern way is
therefore not to disempower but to re-empower it. It is to read its power
differently from what Burke and Kant saw in the sublime, converting its
overpoweringness into an underpowering -- but still powerful -- position
in contemporary life. To undermine the modern sublime in its colossal
character is to rediscover it in the many places of its presentations and
representations. "The sky [is] acutest at its vanishing."29 A non-colossal,
non-amazing sublimity vanishes before our eyes, or rather around them,
dissipating into scene, the seape where it is multiply situated. The
postmodern sublime dis-appears even as it appears, disappears in
appearing.30 Neither phenomenal nor noumenal, it oscillates on the
lintel separating subject from thing, mind' from nature, self from other. It
resituates these oppositional terms in places that allow their tension to
occur differently.
A postmodern sublimity evanesces in its very coalescence -- its
coalescence in places. These places exhibit the sublime withoutcontaining
or holding it, much less simply loeating it. The sublime exceeds any one
place and is immanent in the congeries of places that makes alandscape
into a placescape. Such sublimity does not stand over places, commanding
them from on high; it is not extended in (one) space but distended in
(many) places. In a sublime landscape "all goes onward and outward...and
nothing collapses,"31 even if everything fmally disappears as a
determinate phenomenon. The sublime, as Freud said of sublimation, is
"a way OU1."32 It takes us out of the fixities and definites of the meta-
29 Wallace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West."
34) For this theme, see Irene Klaver, "Silent Wolves: The Howl of the Implicit," in D.
Rothenberg, ed. Wild Ideas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp.117-
133.
31 Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself."
32 The phrase "a way out" in the essay "On Narcissism," Standard Edition of tbe
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth, 1957), XIV, 94:
"sublimation is a wayout, a way by which those demands [of the ego] can be withour
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physics of presence -- of which simple loeation is one crucial expression.
In other words, sublimity occurs by e.s:panding. For Kant, the scope of
reason exceeds not only sensibility and imagination but nature itself.33
Here, however, one must wonder if it is not just the reverse: is it not
nature that exceeds reason in its expansiveness (or, at least, rivals and
rejoins it)? "Everything spatial expands,"34 said Theodor Lipps. This is
surely true of the natural world in its sublimity: it is this world, a wild
place-world, that evaporates in its very vanishing and that disintegrates in
its deliquescence.
But in the end it is not a matter of insisting on nature, not even
wild nature, as the privileged place of the sublime. Inherent in the move
to nature on the part of those Naturphßosophen such as Fichte and
Schelling who were the immediate inheritors of the Critique ofJudgment
-- helpful as this move was in disburdening the human sUbject of
impacted transcendental machinery -- we ean envision a scenography of
situations, a community of places in common, a pluralism of places
themselves.35 And if this is so, I shall have rendered fit homage to Mikel
Dufrenne's invocation of Nature as the very source of the apriori (an
invoeation very much inspired by Schelling in particular), as weIl as the
SQurce of the sublime itself as (in Dufrenne's formulation cited as an
epigram to this essay) that "toward which [subjectivity] transcends itself
and which transcends it."
Kant asserts that the sublime "consists merely in a relation."36
But this relation, 1 have been arguing, is not just that between the
sensible and the supersensible (to which Kant attempts to confine his
discussion), or imagination and reason, or subject and object, or
immanent and transcendent. It is also a relation betWeen places -- places
to which human beings (and doubtless other sentient beings and non-sen-
tient entities) are in turn related by virtue of inhabitation and perception
and action. For all these beings, the place of the sublime is a being-in-
involving repression.
33 "For it is precisely nature's inadequacy to the ideas... that constitutes what both repels
our sensibility and yet attracts us at the time." (Ibid., p. 124).
34 "Alles RaQmliche dehnt· sich aus": cited by Rudolf Arnheim, The Dynamics of
Architectural Form (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1977), p. 86.
3S "It seems, then, that we must not regard a judgment of taste as egoistic rather, we
must regard it necessarily as pluralistic by its inner nature, Le., pn account ofitself rather
than the examples that others give of their taste." (Ibid., p. 140; his italics).
36 Ibid., p. 126; Cf. p. 136: "Simplicity(artless purposi-veness) is, as it were, nature'sstyle
in the sublime" (his italics).It is to be noted that judgment for Kant is the epitome of
relation: e.g., in its capacity to relate subject and predicate, content and object, etc.
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-place among and between places: where "being-in-place" signifies our
active participation in places (and they in us: the relation of "between" is
two-way). These places include the place of the subject as weIl as the
place of discrete objects, the places of social and political subjects in
community, wild places as weIl as domesticated ones, built places and
ones that are merely found, formally defined and informallyexperienced
places. In all such places the sublime appears -- without being a "mere
appearance." And this is so even if (or rather precisely it) the sublime is
ultim,ately a phenomenon of Nature, for in these diverse places, the
sublime is (in a formulation from Le P06tique) "the glory of appearing by
which Nature is accomplished."37 Let us say that the sublime exists
through places by qualifying them: not as a quality but as a suffusive
presence that is emplaced and empowered in them. It transcends subject-
ivity indeed, but it is immanent in the places in which it becomes
manifest. Not located on any phenomenal surface nor in any noumenal
thing in itself, it saturates entire places, from below, sideways, and in
every other which way.
Looked at this way, the sublime becomes the aura of the post-
modern place-world as encountered in its "mere being." As postmodern,
it is elevated beyond the abyss of reason and the (in)comprehension of
imagination without being an august Verticality or a crushing Colossus.
Not being "super-elevated,"38 not being sheerly transcendent, it is
distended laterally, toward the horizon, spreading through the multiple
emplacement of the near sphere. No longer mental, and certainly not
strictly physical, it expands into the indefmite disappearance of its own
de-limitation. This is truly (again in Dufrennets own previously quoted
words) "the sublimation of subjectivity."
The sublime in the glory of its appearing, in its sublimation in
place, is a "palm at the end of the mind, beyond the last thought, rising
in the bronze decor... The [place] stands on the edge of space."39
SUNY at' stony Broak ED CASEY
37 I..e Pootique, p. 172
38 The term "super-elevation" is Derrida's: "Erhaben, the sublime, is not only high,
elevated, nor even very elevated. Very high, absolutely high, higher than any eomparable
height, more tban eomparative, a size not measurable in heigbt, tbe sublime is
superelevatioD beyond itself." ("Parergon," eil. supra, p. 122; his italics).
39 Adapted from Wallaee Stevens, "Of Mere Being."
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